INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following scenario: you are a busy defense attorney and one of your many clients is detained in federal prison awaiting trial. She is accused of a crime but presumably innocent and you are doing all you can to defend against the U.S. government's impending attempt to deprive her of her liberty. To communicate with her, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) allows you to make in-person visits. 1 If you account for travel time and security clearance, however, these can consume the better part of your workday. 2 BOP also provides for confidential postal mail, 3 though physical mail's inefficiency makes it a patently unattractive option. In addition, BOP allows you to arrange for confidential legal phone calls. 4 Depending on the cooperativeness of the correctional officer you deal with, however, arranging one can take as long as a month. 5 To provide for more efficient inmate communications, since 2006 BOP has enabled inmates to send and receive email via the Trust Fund Limited Inmate Computer System (TRULINCS). 6 Assuming your client is computer literate, this would be your best choice, by far, to communicate with her day-to-day. There is, however, just one catch: in order to use TRULINCS your client must sign a form acknowledging that BOP monitors all her emails, including her legal emails. 7 In turn, any email she sends or receives is not protected by the attorney-client privilege and, as four courts have ruled, fair game for the prosecution to read and use as evidence against her. 8 "That's hogwash," a judge in the Eastern District of New York exclaimed during a recent pretrial conference discussing this issue. 9 The rebuke followed an Assistant United States Attorney's statement that the government had "no interest" in reading inmate-attorney emails and would "do their best not to" when reviewing the PDF file of all the defendant's emails BOP provides the government upon request. 10 As the prosecutor explained, the government used to assign a team of staff members to segregate defendants' legal emails from their personal emails, but this practice became too expensive. 11 The government's decision to read inmate-attorney email, the prosecutor thus emphasized, was motivated by administrative necessity as opposed to the desire to gain a strategic advantage. 12 To the judge, the prosecutor's remarks appeared particularly disingenuous given that his office recently issued a letter to the Federal Defenders of New York for the Eastern District declaring, "emails between inmates and their attorneys . . . are not privileged and [the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York] intends to review [them] ." 13 "In this case," the judge proclaimed, "the government will be precluded from looking at any of the attorney-client emails, period." 14 When the transcript of this proceeding became public, the mainstream and legal media denounced the government's decision to read inmateattorney emails as a "draconian and Kafkaesque" violation of the attorney- 14. Tr. of Ahmed Conference, supra note 9, at 21. client privilege. 15 Two subsequent rulings from the Eastern District of New York, however, deemed the practice perfectly legal, if not commendable, because federal inmates are on notice that all their emails-including legal emails-are monitored and therefore unprivileged. 16 This Note assesses the recent rulings (which this Note will refer to as "the email cases") that have divided on whether BOP's email monitoring policy 17 gives the government carte blanche to read inmates' legal email. After summarizing these cases, this Note explores in succession the four major issues they have evoked: (1) why inmates' legal emails are not privileged, 18 (2) whether prosecutors should nevertheless abstain from reading them as a matter of self-regulation, 19 (3) whether prosecutors reading inmate-attorney email is unconstitutional, 20 and (4) whether courts possess independent authority to forbid them from doing so. 21 Part I summarizes the six cases that have addressed the issue of a prosecutor reading an inmate-defendant's legal email. Part II begins by describing the attorney-client privilege generally. 22 It then explains why these cases have unanimously held that it does not apply to inmates' legal email. 23 Part III explores the concept of prosecutorial self-regulation and considers both sides of the argument surrounding whether prosecutors should abstain from reading inmates' legal email even though it is unprivileged. It concludes that they should because doing so unjustifiably chills inmates' ability to communicate confidentially with their counsel.
This Note then explores the arguments defendants have made in opposition to prosecutors who have chosen to read, or threatened to read, their legal email. Part IV examines the defendants' argument that the prosecutors' acts of reading their legal email impermissibly restrict their Sixth Amendment right of access to counsel. 24 This part notes that all courts in the email cases have rejected the defendants' constitutional claims. 25 It asserts, however, that this is because the defendants have attacked the individual prosecutors' acts as opposed to BOP's email 15 . Marlisse Silver Sweeney, Prosecutors Read Jailhouse Emails to Attorneys, L. TECH. NEWS (July 24, 2014), https://advance.lexis.com (within "Browse Sources" search for Law Technology News; then follow "Get Documents" link; then search for article ' 26 Part IV concludes that constitutional challenges to prison regulations require courts to apply stricter standards of review under which BOP's email monitoring policy impermissibly restricts inmates' right of access to counsel. 27 Despite this seemingly meritorious challenge, Part V explains that the inquiry does not end here. In future litigations, as in the email cases, courts may seek to avoid rendering a constitutional decision as they often do. 28 Part V discusses delegated and non-delegated powers federal courts employ to independently regulate prosecutorial conduct they deem improper. 29 In the email cases, courts have divided over whether they can apply these powers. This part asserts that courts can and should prevent prosecutors from reading inmates' email pursuant to their delegated authority to enforce Rules of Professional Conduct. 30 
A. United States v. Fumo
In 2009, Vincent J. Fumo, a former Pennsylvania state senator, was sentenced to fifty-five months in federal prison for charges relating to fraud, tax evasion, and obstruction of justice. 32 The government subsequently appealed, requesting a lengthier sentence based partially on an "explosive trove" of crude emails Fumo sent via TRULINCS to people he knew, including his attorneys. 33 Ultimately, the court resentenced Fumo to an additional six months in prison, citing the emails as evidence that he was unwilling to accept responsibility for his crimes. 34 B. FTC v. National Urological Group, Inc.
In 2008, Jared Wheat, an ill-reputed pharmaceutical distributor, was enjoined from making statements about his company's products unless they 40 At an early pretrial conference defense counsel notified the court that she received enclosures from the government containing recordings of all of her client's emails and phone calls sent from the BOP facility where he was detained. 41 After a discussion among the court, prosecutor and defense attorney, in which the court expressed its disapproval of the government possessing the defendant's legal emails and calls, the prosecutor stated that he would discontinue reviewing the defendant's legal communications. 42 
D. United States v. Asaro
On January 23, 2014, Thomas Di Fiore, along with other members of the notorious Bonanno crime family, was indicted in the Eastern District of New York for charges relating to extortionate collection of credit. 43 Awaiting trial, he was detained at a BOP facility. 44 On June 9, 2014, the government notified the Eastern District bar, including DiFiore's defense attorneys, that from then on it would be reading all emails inmates send via TRULINCS. 45 Defense counsel sent a letter of objection to the court 46 government justified its decision. 47 It stated that it used to voluntarily assign a "taint team"-or group of staff members not assigned to a given case-to redact legal emails from the single PDF of all an inmate's emails BOP provides, but it decided to discontinue this practice because it had become an administrative burden. 48 The government emphasized that its decision to read inmates' legal email was thus motivated by "practical" as opposed to "strategic" concerns." 49 Ultimately, the court issued a written order permitting the government to read the defendant's legal emails going forward. 50
E. United States v. Ahmed
On May 12, 2014, Dr. Syed Imran Ahmed was indicted in the Eastern District of New York for charges relating to Medicare fraud. 51 Like the defendants in Asaro and Saade, he was detained at a BOP facility prior to trial. 52 On June 9, 2014, Ahmed's defense attorney received the same letter that defense counsel in Asaro received, regarding the government's intent to review inmates' legal email, and filed a letter of objection with the court. 53 As in Asaro, the government justified its decision as an administrative necessity as opposed to an attempt to gain a strategic advantage. 54 At a hearing addressing this issue, the court, pursuant to no clear authority, explicitly forbade the government from reading the defendant's legal emails. 55 
F. United States v. Walia
On September 19, 2014, in the Eastern District of New York, Tushar Walia was convicted of charges relating to distribution of a controlled substance. 56 Throughout the course of his trial he was detained, like the defendants in Asaro, Saade, and Ahmed in a BOP facility. 57 As in these prior cases, on June 9, 2014, Walia's defense counsel received notification 47 of the government's intent to read his legal email. He petitioned the court to prevent this, 58 and the government explained that its decision was motivated by the need to conserve resources. 59 Like in Asaro, the court ultimately issued a written order allowing the government to read the defendant's legal emails. 60 In sum, the Fumo and National Urological Group courts allowed the defendant's legal emails in as evidence 61 and the Asaro and Walia courts gave the prosecutor permission to read them. 62 By contrast, the Saade court persuaded the prosecutor to abstain from reading the defendant's legal email, 63 and the Ahmed court, which ruled in the same month and in the same district as the Asaro and Walia courts, 64 explicitly forbade it. 65 The remainder of this Note explores: why none of these courts found the defendants' legal emails privileged; 66 whether prosecutors should nevertheless abstain from reading them as a matter of self-regulation; 67 whether it is unconstitutional for prosecutors to read inmate-attorney email; 68 and whether, apart from the privilege and constitutional issues, courts possess independent authority to forbid prosecutors from reading defendants ' 
A. The Attorney-Client Privilege and Third-Party Presence
The attorney-client privilege is a venerable common law rule of evidence. 70 According to Dean Wigmore, it first appeared in the midsixteenth century as a "natural," "unquestioned" exception to testimonial compulsion. 71 Today, the attorney-client privilege maintains its "exalted place in our jurisprudence;" 72 it is recognized in every U.S. jurisdiction. 73 As the U.S. Supreme Court famously articulated, its purpose is to encourage "full and frank" attorney-client communication, thereby promoting "broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice." 74 In defining the attorney-client privilege, federal courts frequently utilize the definition Dean Wigmore proposed. 75 Alternatively, the Second Circuit employs the following pithy formulation: "the attorney-client privilege protects communications (1) between a client and his or her attorney (2) that are intended to be, and in fact were, kept confidential (3) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice." 76 As commentators note, the justice system does not view the attorneyclient privilege as absolute because, like all evidentiary privileges, in protecting information it impedes the truth-seeking process. 77 Accordingly, the privilege is generally held not to apply if (1) the communication is deemed to have been between a client and someone other than an attorney, 78 (2) the communication was not confidential, 79 or (3) the client sought something other than legal assistance. 80 The relevant question in the email cases is whether or not legal emails inmates know are monitored can be considered confidential. 81 Even if a party asserts that she intended for a given legal communication to remain confidential, courts generally hold her intent to be irrelevant if her conduct belies it. 82 Thus when a party knowingly discloses information in front of a third party, or fails to take reasonable precautions to guard against a third party overhearing, courts generally find that confidentiality could not have been intended and that the privilege therefore does not attach. 83 
B. Because Courts Consider the Phone Recording Device a Third Party, Inmates' Monitored Phone Calls Are Not Privileged
At all BOP facilities inmates' telephone calls may be monitored. 84 The prison warden is statutorily required to put inmates on notice of this policy. 85 In addition, all BOP facilities are required to enable inmates to place unmonitored legal phone calls. 86 These circumstances have called into question whether or not a call an inmate places to an attorney on a line the inmate knows to be monitored is privileged; federal courts have held that it is not. 87 In and the government, which took place over a prison line all parties knew was monitored. 91 The government argued that the conversations were protected by the attorney-client privilege and the district court agreed. 92 The Eighth Circuit, however, disagreed-concluding that because the "presence of the recording device was the functional equivalent of a third party," the parties could not have expected their conversations to remain confidential and therefore the privilege did not attach. 93 In Mejia, the appellant argued that the district court erred in admitting part of a prison call he knew was recorded in which he told his sister to tell his brother to tell his attorney that he wanted to accept a plea before he was indicted. 94 The government, citing Hatcher but taking the opposite position, asserted that the conversation was not privileged because it was made to a third party (i.e., his sister) in the presence of another third party (i.e., the recording device). 95 The Second Circuit agreed and affirmed the district court's decision to admit the call. 96 
C. Because Courts Consider the Email Monitoring Device a Third Party, No Court Has Held That Inmates' Emails Are Privileged
In Fumo, the issue of whether the emails defendant sent via TRULINCS were privileged was not litigated because defense counsel stipulated to the government's argument that in using TRULINCS, which defendant knew was monitored, he had no expectation of privacy and thus "waived the privilege." 97 In Saade, the privilege issue was likewise never subject to formal legal analysis because the court persuaded the prosecutor to stop reading the defendant's legal emails shortly after the issue was first raised at a pretrial hearing. 98 In the remaining email cases, the courts, adopting the government's argument, ruled that the emails were unprivileged because: (1) the defendants' were on notice that their emails were monitored, (2) the computer monitoring system-like the phone recording device in Hatcher and Mejia-is the equivalent of a third party, (3) communications knowingly made in front of third parties cannot be confidential, and 98. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. While the Saade court never claimed the emails were privileged, it is the only court to even balk at the suggestion that they are unprivileged. [A]bove every phone is a warning saying that these are monitored phones, and so that could operate as a waiver . . . The Court: I don't think you really argue that position. I don't think your office takes that . . . position.").
(4) confidentiality is required for a communication to be protected by the attorney-client privilege. 99 
III. EVEN THOUGH INMATES' LEGAL EMAIL IS UNPRIVILEGED, SHOULD PROSECUTORS ABSTAIN FROM READING IT AS A MATTER OF SELF-REGULATION?
As Part II explained to qualify for the attorney-client privilege, a communication must be confidential. 100 As the email cases unanimously hold, because communications knowingly made in front of third parties are not confidential, and because under Hatcher and Mejia prison monitoring devices are considered third parties, federal inmates' email is not confidential, as the inmates know it is monitored, and it is therefore unprivileged. 101 Attorneys may review non-confidential information. From a legally formalistic perspective-as the Fumo, 102 National Urological Group, 103 Asaro 104 and Walia 105 courts have ruled-there is thus no reason why prosecutors may not read inmates' unprivileged legal email. 106 But as the adage goes, just because one may do something does not mean one should. With respect to the email cases, the Ahmed court seems to have felt this way because it forbade the prosecutor, pursuant to no clear authority, from reading the defendant's legal email, 107 despite acknowledging that the email was unprivileged. 108 More significantly, at least one prosecutor's office has voluntarily employed "taint teams" to segregate inmates' unprivileged legal email. 109 Further because there have been just six cases, from only three jurisdictions to address a prosecutor reading an inmate's legal email, 110 which BOP monitors at all of its facilities nationwide, 111 it is likely that other prosecutors' offices also 99. FTC v. Nat'l Urological Grp., Inc., No. 1:04-CV-3294, 2012 WL 171621, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 20, 2012) ("Essentially, TRULINCS requires prisoners using the system to consent to monitoring and warns that communications with attorneys are not privileged."); Asaro Order, supra note 16, at 1 (stating "TRULINCS communications . . . do not qualify for the protection of attorney-client privilege" (citing Mejia, 655 F.3d at 133-35)); Tr. of Ahmed Conference, supra note 9, at 5 ("There are certainly admonitions or warnings that communications over [TRULINCS] choose not to read inmates' legal email. 112 Accordingly, the question arises as to whether all prosecutors, as a matter of self-regulation, should abstain from reading inmates' legal email, even if they may read it because it is unprivileged.
This part addresses that question. Part III.A provides background on prosecutorial self-regulation. Part III.B explains why some prosecutors choose not to read inmates' legal email. Part III.C explains the arguments prosecutors have offered in defense of their decision to read it. Part III.D argues that all prosecutors should abstain from reading inmate-attorney email, even though it is unprivileged, because this behavior unjustifiably chills confidential inmate-attorney communication.
A. Prosecutorial Self-Regulation
As the American Bar Association (ABA) writes, prosecutors are not simply advocates but "ministers of justice." 113 Accordingly, it is their duty to "seek justice, not merely convict." 114 This duty encompasses obvious directives, such as refraining from prosecuting charges one knows are unsupported. 115 Perhaps surprisingly, however, another important part of this duty is to encourage efforts to remediate "inadequacies and injustices" prosecutors detect in "substantive and procedural law." 116 As Professor Bruce A. Green explains, the idea that a prosecutor is an advocate and a quasi-judicial actor partly responsible for the justness of criminal proceedings is generally explained by one of two theories: (1) because prosecutors have great power to bring criminal charges, they must also bear great ethical responsibility, or (2) because prosecutors represent and serve the sovereign, they must seek to meet all of the state's objectives, which in the United States emphatically includes fair process. 117 Regardless of what explanatory theory one accepts, prosecutors' duty to seek justice is a concept that appeals to many in the legal profession. 118 Most importantly, as Green and Professor Fred C. Zacharias point out, many prosecutors themselves take this notion seriously. 119 With respect to federal prosecutors, a testament to this is the degree to which they selfregulate. 120 For example, on its own accord, the U.S. Department of Justice 112. The number of prosecutor's offices that voluntarily abstain from reading inmateattorney email would be valuable data. Capturing it, however, is beyond this Note's scope.
113 (DOJ) promulgated and maintains the U.S. Attorneys' Manual (USAM). 121 The USAM is an internal set of policies that state what federal prosecutors should and should not do. 122 A recent example of DOJ issuing a policy that barred a lawful prosecutorial practice for the sake of "enhancing due process" is its decision to prohibit prosecutors from including ineffective assistance of counsel waivers in plea agreements. 123 In DOJ's own words, even though federal courts have uniformly allowed this practice, DOJ barred it in furtherance of ensuring that the adversarial system functions "fairly, efficiently, and responsibly." 124 In sum, there are federal prosecutors who take seriously their duty to seek justice. Accordingly, they may voluntarily abstain from a given practice if doing so increases fairness, even if it also decreases their ability to secure convictions.
B. Why Some Prosecutors Choose to Abstain from Reading Inmates' Legal Email
At least one prosecutor's office, and likely more, has voluntarily employed taint teams to segregate inmates' unprivileged legal email. 125 This raises the question of why a prosecutor's office would choose to selfregulate with respect to this issue. Though no prosecutor's office has answered this question, answers can be inferred from the arguments that defendants and courts have made against prosecutors who choose to read inmates' legal email.
The first reason a prosecutor's office would choose not to read inmates' unprivileged legal email is to avoid restricting confidential attorney-client communication. As the defendant in Walia argued, because email is now the legal profession's dominant communicative medium, denying inmates the ability to communicate confidentially with counsel via email seriously impedes their overall ability to communicate confidentially with counsel. 126 Prosecutors are well aware of the value our legal system places on 121 127 and the Supreme Court proffered "full and frank" attorney-client communication as the very behavior the attorney-client privilege is meant to promote. 128 A prosecutor's office that chooses not to read inmates' unprivileged legal email is thus likely making this decision, at least in part, in recognition of how critically important it is for a client to be able to communicate confidentially with her attorney.
A second, related reason that a prosecutor's office would abstain from reading inmates' legal email is because the office appreciates the unique difficulties inmates face in communicating with their attorneys. As the defendant in Walia argued and the Ahmed court opined, denying inmates confidential legal email is particularly detrimental to their overall ability to communicate confidentially with counsel because (1) the alternative means of privileged communication BOP offers are inefficient, and (2) most inmates are represented by public defenders with high caseloads and limited resources. 129 It is therefore likely that a prosecutor's office that chooses to abstain from reading inmates' unprivileged legal email does so, at least in part, in recognition of the unique difficulty inmates' face with respect to communicating in confidence with their attorney.
C. Why Some Prosecutors Choose to Read Inmates' Legal Email
Prosecutors in at least three jurisdictions have chosen to read inmates' legal email. 130 Only the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York, however, has provided justifications for its decision. 131 As this office explained in Ahmed, it decided to read inmate-attorney email because it reads inmates' personal email, and it is too expensive to segregate inmates' legal email from the single PDF of all an inmate's email that BOP provides. 132 In other words, for the Eastern District of New York, the decision to read inmate-attorney email was motivated by administrative necessity. As the Ahmed court opined, however, it is hard to imagine that prosecutors are not also motivated to read inmates' legal email in order to gain greater access to the truth. 133 127. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2014) (enumerating attorneys' duties of confidentiality); id. R. 1.4 (enumerating attorneys' duties to communicate with their client); id. R.4.4(b) (requiring an attorney who receives inadvertently sent information pertaining to an adverse party to notify the sender).
128 
D. Prosecutors Should Abstain from Reading Inmate-Attorney Email Because This Behavior Unjustifiably Chills Inmate-Attorney Communication
From a legally formalistic perspective, prosecutors may read inmates' legal email because it is unprivileged. 134 As ministers of justice, however, they should abstain from reading it because this behavior is normatively disfavored within the profession, further disadvantages criminal defendants, and lacks a compelling justification.
In recognition of the critical role communicating in confidence with one's attorney plays in the adversary system, 135 all the actors involved in litigating whether prosecutors can read inmates' legal email have expressed discomfort with them doing so: obviously, inmates and defense attorneys are against it; more significantly, three of the four courts that ruled to allow the practice expressed substantial misgivings about it; 136 more significantly still, until recently the government voluntarily used taint teams to manually segregate inmates' legal email, 137 which provides the inference that the government itself believes eavesdropping on opposing parties' legal communications is undesirable behavior. 138 Thus, while the prosecutors can read inmates' legal email to better their chances of a favorable outcome, the normative consensus among actors who have evaluated the issue, including the government itself, is that they should refrain from doing so because it chills defendants' ability to communicate confidentially with counsel.
Moreover, as recent commentators note, high rates of pretrial detention combined with the threat of draconian mandatory minimum sentences gives federal prosecutors nearly plenary power to extract guilty pleas from defendants. 139 This has pushed federal prosecutors dangerously close to becoming defendants' "inquisitors" as opposed to their adversaries. 140 To deny federal inmates and their attorneys the ability to use the dominant communicative medium of our time to prepare their case only exacerbates this troubling power discrepancy.
Finally, prosecutors should not read inmates' legal email because their decision to do so is not justified by an important legal principle or law 134 enforcement policy. Rather, it is an opportunistic choice that exploits a gap between technological innovation and established norms in order to save money. 141 As the Saade court implied, 142 and as common sense dictates, because over time BOP has successively provided for confidential legal visits, legal mail, and legal phone calls, 143 it will almost certainly eventually provide for confidential legal email. But while BOP had significant financial incentive to provide inmates with email access, 144 its only incentive to provide confidential legal email is that it is normatively the right thing to do. Because prisoners are an extremely weak political group, it is unsurprising that BOP has yet to accommodate this interest. As the ABA suggests, when prosecutors recognize this type of imbalance in the criminal justice system they should seek to remediate it. 145 At the very least, they should not seek to exploit it. In sum, while prosecutors can legally read inmates' legal emails because they are unprivileged, as ministers of justice they should refrain from doing so as this behavior is disfavored within the profession because it chills inmate-attorney communication, further disadvantages inmates, and can be explained as a choice to save money by exploiting the fact that BOP has yet to apply its established norms to new technology.
IV. ARE INMATES' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IMPERMISSIBLY RESTRICTED WHEN PROSECUTORS READ THEIR LEGAL EMAIL?
Part II argues that inmates' legal emails are unprivileged but that prosecutors should nevertheless refrain from reading them. Parts IV and V discuss the arguments defendants have made against prosecutors who choose to read their legal email.
This part discusses whether or not prosecutors reading inmates' legal email is unconstitutional. Part IV.A provides background regarding inmates' Sixth Amendment right of access to counsel which defendants have argued prosecutors impermissibly restrict by reading their legal email. Part IV.B explains the different standards of review courts employ when assessing whether a given action or a prison policy impermissibly restricts this right. Part IV.C notes that all courts have rejected the defendants' constitutional arguments. Part IV.D asserts, however, that defendants' constitutional claims have been unsuccessful because they have argued that the individual prosecutors' acts of reading their legal email, as opposed to BOP's email monitoring policy, impermissibly restricts their constitutional rights. In contrast with claiming that an act restricts an inmate's 
A. Inmates' Sixth Amendment Right of Access to Counsel
As the Supreme Court has proclaimed, "[p]rison walls do not form a barrier" between inmates and constitutional protections. 146 Two constitutional protections inmates retain are the Sixth Amendment right of access to counsel and the right of access to the courts. 147 In the email cases, defendants have argued, thus far unsuccessfully, that even if their legal email is unprivileged, prosecutors cannot read it because doing so impermissibly restricts these rights. 148 By its plain text, the Sixth Amendment guarantees an individual accused of a federal crime the right "to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." 149 Convicted inmates unable to retain private counsel, who have neither the right of access to counsel nor the right to appeal, are thus not cutoff from the justice system; they retain the related "fundamental" constitutional right of access to the courts, which requires prisons to provide for, and ensure they do not impermissibly impede, inmates' ability to bring non-frivolous legal claims. 161 
B. Judicial Review of Prison Regulations That Restrict Inmates' Constitutional Rights
Because prisoners retain constitutional protections, when a given action or prison policy threatens an inmate's constitutional guarantee, federal courts will "discharge their duty" to protect it. 162 As of publication, defendants have not challenged the constitutionality of BOP's email monitoring policy; instead, they have, thus far unsuccessfully, argued on a case-by-case basis that the prosecutor's act of reading their legal email impermissibly restricts their right of access to counsel. 163 Federal courts assess whether an action impermissibly restricts an inmate's constitutional right by ascertaining the degree to which the action restricted the inmate's overall ability to exercise the right. 164 Barring a particularly egregious incident, inmates' constitutional claims are generally dismissed. 165 In contrast with actions that restrict inmates' constitutional rights, prison policies that do so are subject to specific, stricter standards of review. to counsel where the inmate was temporarily unable to call his attorney because the prison administration was slow in placing the attorney's name on the approved call list). But see In re Roark, 56 Cal Rptr. 2d 582, 589 (1996) (holding that prison officials impermissibly restricted the defendant's right of access to counsel where they required the removal and search of his attorney's prosthetic leg prior to visitation, which the attorney refused to comply with); but see also Tucker v. Randall 948 F.2d 388, 390-91 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that denying a pretrial detainee telephone access for four days may be unconstitutional).
165. See supra note 164. 166. See generally 3 MUSHLIN, supra note 147, § 2:3.
Today, Turner v. Safely 167 generally governs cases in which a prison policy's constitutionality is at issue. 168 In Turner, the Court ruled that a prison regulation limiting inmates' ability to correspond with one another did not impermissibly restrict their First Amendment right to free speech, but that a regulation requiring inmates to obtain the prison superintendent's permission prior to marrying did impermissibly restrict their right to marry. 169 The Turner Court announced that when a prison policy restricts inmates' constitutional rights, it is valid if it is "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." 170 In performing this rational basis review, the Court furthered, it is necessary to consider: (1) whether there is a "rational connection" between the regulation and governmental interest, (2) whether there are "alternative means" for the inmates to exercise the restricted right, (3) the effect accommodating the right will have on prison interests and resources, and (4) whether inmates can point to a low-cost alternative to the regulation. 171 The Supreme Court has not provided guidance as to the relative weight of each factor, and lower courts have afforded factors more or less importance depending on a given case's facts. 172 Turner does not, however, govern all cases in which a defendant claims that a prison policy impermissibly restricts her constitutional rights. 173 courts in the email cases have relied on in holding that prosecutors reading inmates' legal email does not impermissibly restrict their right of access to counsel. 175 In Benjamin, the defendants, who were pretrial detainees, challenged several prison policies that caused extensive delays for their attorneys trying to visit them. 176 Defendants brought suit against the prison, claiming that its delay-causing policies infringed their right of access to counsel and access to the courts. 177 Though the Benjamin court stated that it believed the prison policies would fail under Turner, 178 it chose to apply the more inmate-friendly "unjustifiably obstructs" standard articulated in Procunier v. Martinez. 179 In addition, the court applied a standard specifically for pretrial detainees set out in Bell v. Wolfish, 180 which states that regulations restricting pretrial detainees' constitutional rights must be evaluated only in light of prison administrations' central objective, namely, "safeguarding institutional security." 181 The court reasoned that Turner was inapposite and Procunier and Wolfish controlled because the case involved (1) pretrial detainees (at issue in Wolfish) and (2) a regulation restricting inmates' access to counsel (at issue in Procunier), neither of which Turner addressed. 182 Pursuant to this analysis, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment that the prison's delay-causing policies unjustifiably obstructed the defendants' right of access to counsel. 183 The Benjamin court noted that the prison's policies implicated defendants' right of access to counsel and access to the courts, but it made a point to differentiate the two. 184 he right to counsel and the right of access to the courts are interrelated, since the provision of counsel can be a means of accessing the courts. However, the two rights are not the same.").
185. 518 U. S. 343 (1996) .
to the courts claim must show "actual injury" to have standing. 186 Though it is arguable as to whether Lewis's actual injury requirement applies to access to counsel claims, 187 the Benjamin court held that it does not because access to counsel, unlike access to the courts, is a right that the Constitution directly guarantees. 188
C. Courts Have Not Found That Prosecutors Reading Legal Email Is Unconstitutional
In National Urological Group, Asaro, Ahmed, and Walia, the defendants argued that, regardless of whether their legal emails are privileged, the government's decision to read them impermissibly restricts their Sixth Amendment right of access to counsel. 189 In National Urological Group, citing Al-Amin v. Smith, 190 the defendant argued additionally that this behavior violated his right of access to the courts. 191 The National Urological Group court ignored the access to the courts claim and dismissed the access to counsel claim because, it held the Sixth Amendment does not apply in a civil contempt proceeding. 192 In Ahmed, despite barring the government from reading the defendant's legal emails, 193 the court never addressed his access to counsel claim. 194 This issue, however, was given significant attention by the Asaro and Walia courts. 195 Both courts acknowledged the burden that the inability to send privileged email places on inmates' ability to consult their counsel. 196 
D. BOP's Email Monitoring Policy Impermissibly Restricts Inmates' Right of Access to Counsel
In the email cases, the defendants' constitutional arguments claimed only that the prosecutors' behavior, as opposed to BOP's email monitoring policy, restricted their right of access to counsel. 199 The National Urological Group court dismissed this claim under the theory that the Sixth Amendment "does not apply" in civil contempt cases. 200 The Ahmed court did not respond to the defendant's access to counsel claim, 201 and the Asaro and Walia courts, while devoting significant discussion to the defendants' access to counsel claims, ultimately rejected them. 202 In the email cases, the defendants' constitutional arguments have failed because they challenged an action that BOP's email monitoring policy made possible-i.e., the prosecutor reading the defendants' legal email-as opposed to challenging the policy itself. As Asaro and Walia illustrate, courts assess whether an action unconstitutionally restricts an inmate's constitutional rights by, rather amorphously, comparing the degree to which the event inhibited her ability to exercise them. 203 By contrast, constitutional challenges to prison regulations require courts to apply specific, stricter standards of review, 204 under which BOP's email monitoring policy unconstitutionally restricts inmates' right of access to counsel.
The Asaro court, citing Benjamin, ruled that because BOP offers other means of privileged legal communication, its failure to provide privileged email did not unreasonably burden the defendant's right of access to counsel. 205 This ruling is confusing because the defendant never challenged BOP's email monitoring policy. 206 In addition, this ruling is predicated on a plain misreading of Benjamin that the government 198. Asaro Order, supra note 16, at 2; Walia Order, supra note 16, at 30. In so holding, both courts, arguably, adopted a misreading of Benjamin that the government proffered. See infra notes 207-14 and accompanying text.
199. See supra Part IV.C. In National Urological Group, the defendant also argued that the government's behavior impinged his right of access to the courts, which the court ignored. proffered. 207 The Benjamin court stated that it was applying Procunier and Bell. 208 It merely referred to "unreasonably burdens" as a "similar standard" it had adopted in the past and it never mentioned an alternative means test. 209 The Asaro court thus misguidedly ruled on BOP's email monitoring policy's constitutionality pursuant to a standard of review, which the government derived from a misreading of Benjamin, that was intended to respond to the defendant's argument that the prosecutor's behavior-not BOP's email monitoring policy-restricted his right of access to counsel. 210 In Walia, the government submitted the Asaro ruling, 211 and the court rejected the defendant's access to counsel claim pursuant to its logic. 212 The court framed its ruling, however, with respect to the prosecutor reviewing the defendant's legal email; it made no reference to BOP's email monitoring policy. 213 Thus, though the Walia court employed the same misreading of Benjamin that the Asaro court did, its result was more reasonable because the alternative means test it employed accords with analyses other courts have used to assess whether an individual act, or set of acts, impermissibly restricts an inmate's constitutional rights. 214 In order to avoid the confusing, unfavorable results Walia and Asaro represent, future defendants should explicitly argue that BOP's email monitoring policy unconstitutionally restricts their right of access to counsel. This clearly should prompt courts to apply either the four-part Turner test, 215 or an appropriate alternative, such as Procunier 216 and its progeny, which include Benjamin. Whether a court would apply one or the other in a given Sixth Amendment challenge to BOP's email monitoring policy is arguable. 217 For this Note's purposes, however, the question is moot because BOP's email monitoring policy impermissibly restricts inmates' right of access to counsel under either standard. In contrast to the Asaro court's holding, a proper analysis of a prison regulation under Benjamin asks if a prison policy "unjustifiably obstructs" the availability of pretrial detainees' representation. This inquiry analyzes this question only in relation to prison administrations' central objective, "safeguarding institutional security." 218 BOP's email monitoring policy fails this test. As the defense attorneys in Walia rightly observe, in today's American legal profession, email is how business is done. 219 In addition, for anyone working with an attorney, the ability to communicate confidentially is paramount. 220 Denying pretrial detainees confidential legal email thus plainly obstructs their representation's availability. 221 Further, security concerns cannot justify this obstruction. BOP cannot say it views confidential inmate-attorney communication as a security threat because BOP allows inmates to communicate confidentially with counsel via every other communicative media that it offers. 222 There is nothing unique about email to warrant making it the first exception to this rule. In fact, per BOP's own reasoning, confidential email is safer than confidential legal visits or confidential physical mail because one cannot smuggle contraband via email. 223 Thus, under Benjamin's application of Procunier and Bell, because BOP's email monitoring policy obstructs the availability of pretrial detainees' attorneys, and because this obstruction is not justifiable as a security measure, it impermissibly restricts pretrial detainees' right of access to counsel.
If a court chose to apply the four-part Turner test 224 in considering whether BOP's email monitoring policy impermissibly restricts inmates' right of access to counsel, it would reach the same result. Though BOP has never had occasion to state in a legal proceeding what their interest is in monitoring inmates' email communication, it is presumably the same interest it has in monitoring phone calls and physical mail-i.e., maintaining institutional security. 225 Maintaining institutional security is a legitimate penological interest under Turner. 226 With respect to the first factor, a court would almost certainly find monitoring inmates' emails rationally related to maintaining institutional security. In addition, the second factor also favors BOP because inmates have alternative means of exercising their right to communicate confidentially with counsel. 227 Nevertheless, with respect to the third factor, far from having a negative effect on institutional security or prison resources, providing inmates confidential legal email would benefit each. As BOP states, it provided inmates email to limit the risk of incoming contraband and to ease the administrative burden that arranging for phone calls and in-person visits creates. 228 Enabling inmates to communicate confidentially with counsel via email would further both these goals. Finally, with respect to the fourth factor, as the Ahmed court opined, any casual user of Google Mail would find it difficult to imagine that BOP could not, at a low cost, simply add a feature to TRULINCS that filtered emails to and from inmates' attorneys of record. 229 It is true that monitoring inmate communication is rationally related to BOP's legitimate penological interest in maintaining institutional security, and inmates have other means by which to communicate confidentially with counsel. However because providing for confidential legal email would have a positive effect on institutional security and prison resources (and likely it would be easy to provide), BOP's email monitoring policy impermissibly restricts inmates' right of access to counsel under Turner.
V. CAN FEDERAL COURTS PREVENT PROSECUTORS FROM READING INMATES' LEGAL EMAIL ON NON-CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS?
Part IV.D argues that BOP's email monitoring policy impermissibly restricts inmates' Sixth Amendment right of access to counsel. In the email cases, however, BOP's email monitoring policy was not at issue. 230 In future litigations, this is likely to remain the case because busy defense attorneys probably will continue to make case-by-case arguments regarding individual prosecutor's behavior rather than invest the resources in bringing a challenge against BOP. Moreover, in general, federal courts seek to avoid deciding issues on constitutional grounds where possible. 231 According to this principle of judicial restraint courts often choose not to address constitutional issues that have not been explicitly raised by the appropriate parties. 232 Thus even if a defense attorney challenged BOP's email monitoring policy, a court would likely hesitate to rule on the issue if BOP was not a party, or it felt it had an alternative ground upon which to decide the case.
The question thus arises: Where the constitutionality of BOP's email monitoring policy is not properly at issue, or a court does not want to decide it, is there a legitimate alternative ground upon which a court can prevent a prosecutor from reading a defendant's legal email?
Part V explains that federal courts can negate the effects of a constitutionally questionable prosecutorial practice, without rendering a constitutional decision, by exercising their power to regulate prosecutors' behavior. Part V.A provides background on delegated and non-delegated versions of these powers. Part V.B notes that three defendants in the email cases appealed to the courts to use non-delegated variants of this power to prevent prosecutors from reading their legal email. The courts, however, rejected these petitions, concluding instead that they lacked the legal basis to prevent the prosecutor from doing so. Two courts, however, sua sponte, implicitly employed a non-delegated variant of this power to rule in the defendants favor. 233 Thus, Part V.B observes, either the four former courts were incorrect or the two latter courts exceeded their authority.
Part V.C asserts that the two courts that implicitly employed their nondelegated power to regulate prosecutors in order to prevent them from reading the defendant's legal email acted within their authority. Part V.C argues, however, that future courts should prevent prosecutors from reading inmates' legal email pursuant to their delegated authority to enforce Rules of Professional Conduct. This is because explicit rulings pursuant to delegated authority raise less separation of powers concerns and have more precedential value as compared to implicit rulings pursuant to nondelegated authority. Specifically, Part V concludes courts should prevent prosecutors from reading inmates' legal email by enforcing Rule 8.4(d), which prohibits attorneys from engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. 234 
A. Delegated and Non-Delegated Powers Federal Courts Use to Regulate Prosecutors
Unlike state courts, which adopt professional conduct codes, 235 They nevertheless routinely do so by enforcing established rules of procedure 237 or utilizing rulemaking authority Congress explicitly granted them. 238 In addition, federal courts can enforce the McDade Amendment, 239 a federal statute authorizing them to apply state ethics rules to regulate prosecutorial conduct, even if it is otherwise lawful. 240 As Professors Zacharias and Green note, when courts exercise their delegated powers to regulate prosecutors, it is relatively uncontroversial, because their authority to do so is apparent. 241 As Zacharias and Green further note, however, federal courts also regulate prosecutors pursuant to forms of nondelegated authority, including setting standards of conduct "indirectly"(i.e. informally during proceedings) 242 and using their "inherent authority" to control their own proceedings 243 and "supervisory authority" over the administration of the criminal justice system. 244 When federal courts exercise these powers, it is more controversial because it is unclear whether they truly posses them and, if they do, what their scope is. 245 2014) . This case applied a state ethics opinion pursuant to the McDade Amendment to bar prosecutors from including ineffective assistance of counsel waivers in plea agreements despite federal courts' "nearly unanimous" opinion that it is legal to do so. Id. The ethics rule the court adopted was a "formal opinion," issued by the Kentucky Bar Association, which held that this practice violated Kentucky's professional conduct rule prohibiting conflicts of interest. K.Y. RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2014). The formal opinion reasoned that a defense attorney advising a client to accept a plea that includes a waiver of his right to appeal for ineffective assistance of counsel is inherently conflicted. REV. 1433 REV. (1984 . Green and Zacharias also note as nondelegated sources of judicial authority "the authority of the federal courts to control the admission of lawyers to practice before them" and "the inherent authority of federal courts to protect their own jurisdiction." Zacharias & Green, supra note 232, at 1310-14. These two sources of federal courts' authority to regulate prosecutors are beyond this Note's scope.
Regulating Attorney Conduct in Federal Court
245. Zacharias & Green, supra note 232, at 1308-14.
The Delegated Authority of Federal Courts to Regulate Prosecutors Through the Rules of Professional Conduct
Congress has delegated general rulemaking authority to federal courts. 246 Pursuant to this authority, federal courts promulgate "local rules" to regulate attorney conduct. 247 The vast majority of district courts adopt the Rules of Professional Conduct that the state in which they sit employs, which typically reflect the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 248 In addition, in 2000, in the wake of scandals surrounding federal prosecutors' attempts to exempt themselves from state Rules of Professional Conduct, Congress enacted the McDade Amendment. 249 It is titled "Ethical Standards for Attorneys for the Government" and states that federal prosecutors will be "subject to State laws and rules and local Federal court rules," wherever they practice. 250 After the McDade Amendment, even if a district court has not adopted a state rule of professional conduct as one of its local rules, it can still enforce any rule of professional conduct adopted by the state in which it sits. 251 One question that Zacharias and Green raise, and that is relevant to this Note, is how a federal court should proceed when it believes a prosecutor's behavior is plainly wrong but no local rule, state rule of professional conduct, or any other authority specifically proscribes it. 252 This is the case in the email cases. 253 One option for courts in this situation is to broadly interpret a vague rule of professional conduct such as 8.4(d), which prohibits lawyers from engaging in "conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice." 254 Lower courts' interpretations of vague Rules of Professional Conduct, however, can be perceived as inappropriately exploiting the rules' open-textured language to give effect to idiosyncratic judicial preferences. 255 To this end, in analyzing lower court applications of Rules of Professional Conduct, a threshold question that has arisen is whether or not the court is enforcing a true "ethics rules," as opposed to effectuating a policy choice. 256 The Tenth Circuit argues that ethics rules (1) address conduct the legal profession consensually deems inappropriate and (2) are directed specifically at attorneys. 257 Zacharias and Green suggest that ethics rules (1) apply to all lawyers (because rules that apply only to a subclass of lawyers are too likely to implicate policy choices) and (2) primarily impact lawyers as opposed to institutions. 258 
Non-Delegated Authority Federal Courts Use to Regulate Prosecutors
For a federal court seeking to control a prosecutor's behavior where no local rule, state rule of professional conduct, or any other authority specifically proscribes it, an alternative to interpreting a vague rule of professional conduct is to act pursuant to one of the non-delegated powers federal courts have historically employed to regulate prosecutors' behavior. 259 These include their ability to set standards indirectly, 260 their inherent authority over their own proceedings, 261 and their supervisory power over the administration of the criminal justice system. 262 
a. Indirect Standard Setting
As Zacharias and Green note, the most common way federal courts regulate prosecutorial behavior is by "setting standards indirectly," or making ad hoc decisions throughout the litigation process that communicate the court's view of appropriate conduct. 263 These decisions may be memorialized in a written opinion, appear on the record as oral admonitions, or remain unrecorded. 264 Though regulating prosecutors in this fashion can be effective, as Zacharias and Green point out, it is unclear what authority courts act pursuant to when doing so; in turn, because federal prosecutors exercise executive discretion, the prospect of courts constraining their behavior pursuant to no clear authority raises acute separation of powers concerns. 265 In the email cases, both courts that prevented prosecutors from reading inmates' legal email did so by issuing oral admonitions, pursuant to no clear authority, at pretrial hearings. 266 
b. Inherent Judicial Authority over Their Own Proceedings
Several defense attorneys in the email cases have unsuccessfully petitioned the courts to prevent prosecutors from reading their clients' legal emails by exercising their inherent authority to control their own proceedings. 267 As Zacharias and Green point out, while this source of non-delegated authority is widely recognized, it is generally narrowly employed to punish lawyer activity that threatens a court's efficient operations, 268 such as bad faith conduct 269 or tardiness. 270 
c. Supervisory Authority over the Administration of the Criminal Justice System
The Supreme Court has long recognized federal courts' power to regulate prosecutors' behavior pursuant to their "supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice." 271 As Zacharias and Green note, however, this power's scope has been subject to much judicial and 273 the Court stated that the power should be used to "maintain[] civilized standards of procedure and evidence," and exercised it to exclude confessions obtained coercively though not illegally. 274 As commentators argue, however, McNabb represents an era where courts applied this power too liberally, 275 as broad judicial discretion to regulate law enforcement practices smacks of interbranch encroachment. 276 Most recently, the Court has cabined its use. 277 Judge John Gleeson suggests that it should be used only to remedy "violations of federal law in the evidence gathering process that actually prejudice the defendants." 278 Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, in the email cases only one defendant referred to this power, and implicitly at that.
B. The Courts Divide on Whether They Have Regulatory Authority to Prevent Prosecutors from Reading the Defendants' Legal Emails
In Fumo, defense counsel never explicitly contested the government's use of their client's legal emails as evidence and the court thus admitted them with little question. 279 In National Urological Group, Asaro, and Walia, upon concluding that the defendants' legal emails were not privileged, and that the prosecutors reading them did not impermissibly restrict the defendants' constitutional rights, the courts permitted the prosecutors to read the defendants' legal email. 280 In allowing this, however, all courts but the National Urological Group court expressed significant discomfort with the practice, as well as sympathy for the defendants' inability to email their counsel confidentially. 281 Presumably in hope of appealing to this sympathy, the defendants in Asaro and Walia advanced several policy arguments regarding the benefits confidential legal email provides. 282 Based on these arguments, they impelled the courts to exercise their inherent power to control their own proceedings to prevent the prosecutor from reading their clients' legal email, notwithstanding the prosecutors' ability to do so lawfully. 283 In Walia, the defense attorneys argued additionally that the inability to send confidential legal email made it impossible for them to comply with their obligations under Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4, 284 inviting the court to exercise its delegated authority to enforce Rules of Professional Conduct. 285 Despite their avowed sympathy for the defendants' position, however, the Walia and Asaro courts chose not to respond to any of these arguments, concluding instead that there was no "legal basis" to prohibit the government from reviewing the defendants' legal emails. 286 In Saade, however, despite never adjudging the practice illegal, the court prevented the prosecutor from reviewing the defendant's legal email. 287 Upon discussing the issue at a pretrial hearing the court offered the prosecutor, what it called, an "off the cuff reaction": the court stated that prosecutors should not be able to read inmate-attorney email because they cannot eavesdrop on inmate-attorney meetings or phone calls, or read inmates' legal mail, and it should not "make a difference whether the mode of communication is more modern or more traditional." 288 Shortly thereafter the prosecutor volunteered to refrain from reading the defendant's legal emails. 289 In Ahmed, the court conceded that the defendant's legal emails were unprivileged. 290 In addition, it never addressed either the defendant's argument that in reading them the prosecutor impermissibly restricted his right of access to counsel, or the defendant's request for the court to exercise its inherent powers to control its own proceedings to prevent this behavior. 291 The court nevertheless issued an oral ruling, pursuant to no clear authority, expressly prohibiting the government from reading the defendant's legal emails. 292 Unlike other courts treating this issue, the Ahmed court expressed a high level of knowledge concerning the difficulty defendants and defense attorneys face in arranging for in-person legal visits and unmonitored phone calls at BOP facilities. 293 In addition, the court took special exception with the government's contention that it was only choosing to review inmateattorney email because it could no longer afford to implement taint teams, not because it sought to gain a strategic advantage. 294 Finally, the court noted in its opinion that the government could easily update TRULINCS to provide for a filtering function to segregate email between inmates and their attorneys of record. 295 In sum, courts have unanimously held that inmates' legal emails sent via TRULINCS are unprivileged, 296 and no court has held that prosecutors reading these emails impermissibly restricts inmates' right of access to counsel or right of access to the courts. 297 As a result, despite expressing various levels of sympathy for the defense position, the Fumo, National Urological Group, Asaro, and Walia courts held that there was no legal basis to prohibit the government from reading the defendants' legal email. The Saade and Ahmed courts, however, did just that, though pursuant to no clear authority. Thus, either the Fumo, National Urological Group, Asaro, and Walia courts were incorrect, or the Saade and Ahmed courts acted beyond their authority's scope.
C. Federal Courts Should Prevent Prosecutors from Reading Inmates' Legal Email By Enforcing Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d)
The email cases evoked four forms of federal courts' authority to regulate federal prosecutors: their ability to enforce Rules of Professional Conduct, 298 their ability to set standards indirectly, 299 their inherent power to manage their own proceedings, 300 and their supervisory authority over the administration of the criminal justice system. 301 The ability to enforce Rules of Professional Conduct is the most appropriate form of this power for a federal court to exercise in preventing a prosecutor from reading a defendant's legal email.
Though effective in practice, as in Saade and Ahmed, judicial acts that set standards indirectly lack precedential value and raise separation of powers concerns, especially when they constrain executive discretion. 302 Preventing prosecutors from reading defendants' legal email pursuant to this power is therefore not optimal.
With regard to courts' inherent power to manage their proceedings, it is unsurprising that, despite defendants' enjoinders, no court exercised this authority to prevent prosecutors from reading defendants' legal email. 303 It is unsurprising because this power's function is to ensure the efficiency of day-to-day courtroom operations, not to second guess lawful executive evidence-gathering practices. 304 295. Id. at 11 ("And I find it very hard to believe that the Department of Justice, with all the resources that it has . . . cannot come up with a simple program that segregates identified [attorney] e-mail addresses.").
296. Because barring judicially disfavored executive evidence-gathering practices was once exactly what federal courts used their supervisory authority over the criminal justice system to do, 305 preventing prosecutors from reading defendants' legal email pursuant to this authority may appear appropriate. As Judge Gleeson and others have argued persuasively, however, liberal use of this authority smacks of inter-branch encroachment. 306 Pursuant to Judge Gleeson's analysis of what constitutes an appropriate exercise of this power, 307 it is improper for federal courts to prevent prosecutors from reading defendants' legal email pursuant to it because this behavior is not a clear violation of federal law. 308 Unlike the three aforementioned non-delegated powers federal courts exercise to regulate prosecutors' behavior, Congress explicitly has authorized federal courts to regulate federal prosecutors by enforcing Rules of Professional Conduct. 309 Judicial rulings pursuant to this authority, assuming they are proper, therefore raise fewer separation of powers concerns because they are grounded in congressionally delegated authority. To be proper, such rulings must function as ethics rules-as opposed to judicial policy preferences 310 -that either specifically cover the facts at issue or can be reasonably interpreted to do so. 311 Under the tests of the Tenth Circuit and Zacharias and Green, 312 a rule of professional conduct preventing prosecutors from reading inmates' legal email is an ethics rule. A rule preventing this behavior could apply to all lawyers, including, as in Hatcher, 313 defense attorneys seeking to eavesdrop on cooperating witnesses' legal communication. In addition, it would address conduct that the legal profession consensually disfavors. 314 Finally, it would only affect attorney conduct, as neither BOP nor any other institution would have to alter its practices.
Having determined that a rule preventing federal prosecutors from reading inmates' legal email would qualify as an ethics rule, the next question is whether there is a rule of professional conduct that specifically prohibits this behavior or can be reasonably interpreted to. It is possible that state bar associations will publish formal ethics opinions that speak directly to the issue of prosecutors reading inmates' legal email. offer inmates the ability to send and receive email, 316 presumably making this an issue of little interest to state bar associations.
Because it is unlikely that a state bar association will issue an opinion specifically addressing whether prosecutors can read inmates' legal email, a federal court seeking to prevent this practice on non-constitutional grounds will have to apply a rule of professional conduct that can reasonably be interpreted as proscribing it. As Zacharias and Green note, federal courts often apply Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d), which prohibits conduct "prejudicial to the administration of justice," to sanction or bar conduct that is "plainly wrong" but not otherwise specifically proscribed. 317 Rule 8.4(d) is the most appropriate rule by which to prevent prosecutors from reading inmates' legal email.
Although Rule 8.4(d)'s open-textured wording has been understandably criticized for being overinclusive, and thus raising due process concerns because attorneys cannot predict how it will apply to them, 318 preventing federal prosecutors from reading inmates' legal email is within its scope. As one set of commentators writes, the debate leading to the adoption of Rule 8.4(d) by the ABA House of Delegates explained that it should only apply to violations of clear norms and conventions of practice. 319 In other words, it should prohibit conduct that is "plainly wrong" in the profession's eyes, not just in the eyes of individual judges. Because prosecutors reading defendants' legal emails chills defendants' ability to communicate confidentially with counsel-an ability long recognized as critical to the adversary system-all the parties litigating this issue, including the government itself, have recognized its inappropriateness. 320 Prosecutors reading defendants' legal email is thus precisely the type of conduct, viewed as normatively improper within the profession but difficult to foresee, that Rule 8.4(d)'s open-textured, flexible language was meant to proscribe.
CONCLUSION
The American legal profession recognizes the ability to communicate confidentially with an attorney as a-if not the-critical component of the adversary system. As such, it is unsurprising that prosecutors reading inmates' unprivileged legal email, despite this practice's legality, is behavior that no one, not even prosecutors themselves, truly approves of. At least one advocacy group has begun to pressure BOP to alter TRULINCS in order to provide for unmonitored inmate-attorney email. 321 Fortunately, because BOP provides for confidential legal visits, mail, and phone calls it seems likely that it is only a matter of time before BOP provides inmates the ability to email their attorneys confidentially.
Until BOP provides inmates' confidential legal email, this Note argues that prosecutors should abstain from reading inmates' legal email as a matter of self-regulation. It asserts that, in cases where they do not, there are legal bases to prevent them. Prisoners' rights advocates should challenge BOP's email monitoring policy under the theory that it unconstitutionally restricts inmates' right of access to counsel, and courts should uphold this challenge. Where BOP's email monitoring policy is not at issue, or where a court seeks to avoid a constitutional decision, courts should prevent prosecutors from reading inmates' legal email by invoking Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d). 
